Should a White Person Ever Use the N-word?

10 November 2020

Should a White Person Ever Use the N-word?

No.

As a White person, it’s not my place to explain why the term when coming out of the mouths of White people is offensive, while when coming out of the mouths of Black people it may not be. So, here is Ta-Nehisi Coates, who gives a clear and linguistically correct explanation.

Watch (5-minute video):

My editorial policy on this site is to not use the n-word. In my everyday speech and writing, I don’t use that word at all, and I try not to use other offensive terms lightly or without consideration, but on this site I don’t shy away from using such words when those words are the topic of discussion—I find it strange and even overly precious to avoid saying a word when one is talking about a word. But the n-word, when coming from the mouth or keyboard of a White person like me, is so inflammatory and offensive and the ongoing history of White supremacy is such that I do not want to use it even in that context.

In recent posts I have expurgated the word or referred to it as the n-word. I have expurgated it even in quotations where the word is intact in the original text, using square brackets to mark the fact that it is me who is doing the eliding (i.e., n[——]). In these cases, I don’t think anyone will misinterpret what the original text actually says, so nothing is lost in the elision. If you find an old post that uses the word in a quotation it is because I have missed it. If you let me know about it, I will correct it.

The sole exception to this policy is the entry for the n-word itself, where I do use the word once to establish beyond doubt what word I am writing about. Elsewhere I have expurgated or used n-word wherever the double-g spelling appears. I have left other, earlier variant spellings intact so one can see how the form of the word developed over time.

If anyone is offended by this limited use of the word on this site, please accept my apologies. And if you have constructive criticism on this policy or how I have described the word, I sincerely want to hear it.

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What Do We Mean by Anglo-Saxon? Pre-Conquest to the Present

19 October 2020

My article on how the term Anglo-Saxon has been used over the centuries has finally been officially published.

A pdf of the paper can be downloaded from JSTOR. (JSTOR access required to download at no cost.)

The raw data, in the form an Excel spreadsheet, can downloaded from here.

Wilton, David. “What Do We Mean By Anglo-Saxon? Pre-Conquest to the Present.” Journal of English and Germanic Philology (JEGP), 119.4, October 2020, 425–54.

The article uses linguistic corpora, ranging from the Dictionary of Old English Corpus to the Corpus of Contemporary American English, to trace the usage and senses of the term Anglo-Saxon from the early medieval period through to the present day. It shows that in the early medieval period, while the term was used on the Continent insular use prior to Norman Conquest was rare, referred only to the unified kingdom of Mercia and Wessex, and was limited to the context of royal intitulature. Following the Conquest, it disappeared from English usage before being re-borrowed from continental Latin in the late sixteenth century. And starting at the turn of the nineteenth century it began to be applied to contemporary contexts, first as politico-cultural marker for things English or British, and shortly afterward as an ethno-racial marker. Present-day use of Anglo-Saxon, even in academic circles, is usually not as a reference to the pre-Conquest era, but rather as a contemporary identity label, usually as a marker of whiteness, or as a politico-cultural marker for the global dominance of U.S./British cultural, political, and economic institutions and policies. While the use of the term as an identity label is strongest in North America, such use makes up a substantial percentage of British usage as well.

The results of this study have implications for how the field of medieval studies, and studies of pre-Conquest England in particular, use Anglo-Saxon. Not only is the term analytically problematic because it conflates ethnically and politically distinct peoples in the pre-Conquest era, but its present-day use as a ethno-racial identity marker inevitably associates the field with race and whiteness at a time when the field is striving to break from its roots in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century, ethno-nationalist thinking.

super-precedent

18 October 2020

Well, in my writings, so as a professor, I talked about the doctrine of stare decisis, and super precedent is not a doctrinal term that comes from the Supreme Court and I think maybe in political conversation or in newspapers, people use it different ways. But in my writing, I was using a framework that’s been articulated by other scholars. And in that context, super-precedent means precedent that is so well established that it would be unthinkable that it would ever be overruled. And there are about six cases on this list that other scholars have identified.

—Amy Coney Barrett, 13 October 2020

Super-precedent is term that has been in the news this week, and it’s an excellent example of how a term’s meaning can change over time and how a term can mean different things to different people.

In deciding cases, judges are supposed to follow the rule of stare decisis, which is Latin meaning to stand by things that have been decided. In other words, judges are supposed to be guided by the decisions that courts have previously made. Overturning a precedent is not something to be done lightly.

The term super-precedent was first used in a law review article written by William Landes and Richard Posner in 1976, but they defined it quite differently than Judge Coney Barrett does in the above quote. Landes and Posner were trying to devise a framework to determine the relative importance of various cases, or in other words, how to measure how precedential a particular decision was. They considered using a count of the number of times a case is cited but rejected that. Landes and Posner write:

In some instances, counting citations may result in underestimating the true number of precedents by excluding the precedent that is so effective in defining the requirements of the law that it prevents legal disputes from arising in the first place or, if they do arise, induces them to be settled without litigation. In the limit, such a “superprecedent” might never be cited in an appellate opinion yet have greater precedential significance that the most frequently cited cases. But such cases are probably rare.

Landes and Posner use super in its Latin sense meaning beyond. To them, a super-precedent is not a precedent of higher rank; it is a decision that is so fundamental that it cannot even be understood within the framework of precedent.

Linguistically though, Landes and Posner’s use is an outlier. Not only do they define it differently than later writers would, but the concept doesn’t appear again for nearly twenty-five years, when on 28 July 2000 Judge John Luttig raises it in a concurring opinion in Richmond Medical Center v. Gilmore. Luttig does not use super-precedent, but uses super-stare decisis instead, specifying that the abortion cases of Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey are super-precedents and settled legal questions that should not be revisited by the courts:

I understand the Supreme Court to have intended its decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey to be a decision of super-stare decisis with respect to a woman's fundamental right to choose whether or not to proceed with a pregnancy (“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe v. Wade, that definition of liberty is still questioned....After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.”). And I believe this understanding to have been not merely confirmed, but reinforced, by the Court's recent decision in Stenberg v. Carhart (“This Court, in the course of a generation, has determined and then redetermined that the Constitution offers basic protection to the woman's right to choose. We shall not revisit those legal principles.”).

Luttig is not advancing the idea of a class of cases that cannot be revisited, but rather says that if courts have, over time, steadfastly refused to revisit a case, then it becomes a settled question. It should be noted that both Posner and Luttig were conservative, federal appeals court judges, now both retired.

But Luttig’s opinion brought the concept of super-precedent into conservative legal circles. It was an attractive concept, declaring a small number of cases off limits would allow judges to overturn those that were mere precedents, effectively gutting the concept of stare decisis while pretending to abide by it.

Super-precedent was used a number of times during the 13 September 2005 Senate confirmation hearing for Chief Justice John Roberts. In the following exchange between Roberts and Senator John Cornyn, the incoming chief justice seems to reject the notion of super-precedent, but states that Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and by implication Roe v. Wade, are not irrevocable decisions:

CORNYN.      Well, I know that we have heard today about a number of terms from stare decisis to pro hac vice, to pro forma, to—the only one we have not heard is res ipsa loquitur and a number of other Latin phrases that we learned in law school. Let me ask you about stare decisis. I have heard fascinating discussion back and forth about precedent and how you would deal with a case, let’s say for example, Roe v. Wade, and some have suggested, law professors and maybe others, that somehow that is a super precedent, or in the words of our inimitable Chairman, a super-duper precedent. I think we are introducing new words to the legal lexicon as this hearing goes on. But in all seriousness, if—well, let me ask you this. Is stare decisis an insurmountable obstacle to revisiting a decision based on an interpretation of the Constitution?

ROBERTS.     What the Supreme Court has said, in the Casey decision, for example, is that it is not an inexorable command. In other words, it’s not an absolute rule, and that’s why they have these various cases that explain the circumstances under which you should revisit a prior precedent that you think may be flawed and when you shouldn’t.

As Cornyn indicates, there was little agreement among the committee on what a super-precedent, or a super-duper precedent, was. But a concise definition would soon come. In a 2007 article in the George Mason Law Review, Michael Sinclair defines it as follows:

To say a case is a super-precedent means it is judicially unshakeable, a precedential monument which may not be gainsaid.

But while Luttig said that a court’s refusal to revisit a case is grounds for considering it a settled question, Sinclair disagrees, instead using a criterion of political opposition to a decision to determine whether or not it is a super-precedent:

Of course this discussion arises in the context of the right to terminate a pregnancy and the status of Roe v. Wade and its successor in principle, Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Some would like the sequence to be considered unchallengeable. But there is a significant portion of the population ardently against permitting a woman to control her own reproductive function, significant enough to influence elections. Judicial sensitivity to societal demands thus puts the adaptivity of Roe v. Wade in question as it is repeatedly challenged in state legislation. Thus it should not be called a super-precedent.

And Coney Barrett has followed Sinclair’s lead. She agrees with Sinclair’s definition in the quotation at the head of this article, and she also agrees that the two landmark abortion cases are not examples of a super-precedent. In this exchange with Senator Amy Klobuchar, she uses the same political criterion as Sinclair, not a legal one, to determine what is a super-precedent:

Klobuchar:      Okay. Well, you also separately acknowledged that in a Planned Parenthood V Casey, the Supreme Court’s controlling opinion talked about the reliance interests on Roe V Wade, which it treated in that case, as super-precedent. Is Roe a super precedent?

Coney Barrett: How would you define super-precedent?

Klobuchar: Actually, I thought someday I’d be sitting in that chair. I’m not. I’m up here. So I’m asking you.

Coney Barrett: Well, people use super-precedent differently.

Klobuchar: Okay.

Coney Barrett: The way that it’s used in the scholarship and the way that I was using it in the article that you’re reading from was to define cases that are so well settled that no political actors and no people seriously push for their overruling. And I’m answering a lot of questions about Roe, which I think indicates that Roe doesn’t fall in that category. And scholars across the spectrum say that doesn’t mean that Roe should be overruled, but descriptively, it does mean that it’s not a case that everyone has accepted and doesn’t call for its overruling.

Super-precedent has evolved. From 1976 into the 2000s the term was defined by a judicial criterion of whether or not courts chose to revisit and question past decisions. If the courts did not, then over time it would become a settled question, a super-precedent. But in the early 2000s the criterion shifted to a political one, whether or not a decision was popular, and decisions that faced political opposition were fair game for courts to overturn, while courts could not touch popular decisions, regardless of whether or not they were based on sound judicial grounds. In 2005, the very idea of super-precedent was controversial, with John Roberts avoiding embracing the topic in his confirmation hearings, but by 2020, the concept was fully embraced by Amy Coney Barrett.

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Sources:

Amy Coney Barrett Senate Confirmation Hearing Day 2 Transcript.” Rev.com, 13 October 2020.

Landes, William M. and Richard A. Posner. “Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.” The Journal of Law and Economics, 19.2, August 1976, 251. JSTOR Complete.

Richmond Medical Center for Women. v. James Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376, 376-77, U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit. 28 July 2000). Thomson Reuters Westlaw.

Sinclair, Michael. “Precedent, Super-Precedent.” George Mason Law Review, 14.2, Winter 2007, 365, 403.

Torrez, Andrew and Thomas Smith. “OA430: Amy Coney Barrett Is Terrible” (podcast). Opening Arguments, episode 430, 15 October 2020.

United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States. J–109–37, 109th Congress, first session, 12–15 September 2005, 270.

Boneless Chicken Wings

Far Side cartoon, by Gary Larson, depicting limp chickens scattered about a bucolic environment with a sign that reads “Boneless Chicken Ranch”

Far Side cartoon, by Gary Larson, depicting limp chickens scattered about a bucolic environment with a sign that reads “Boneless Chicken Ranch”

3 September 2020

On 31 August 2020, Ander Christensen made an impassioned plea before the Lincoln, Nebraska city council to ban the use of the term boneless chicken wings in local restaurant menus, arguing that the term was misleading. But by the end of the video it becomes obvious that Christensen is less than serious about his cause. So, enjoy it for the rhetoric, not the logic.

Of course, words and phrases mean what we use them to mean, and in the case of boneless chicken wings, there is no misunderstanding among customers as to what they are ordering. So, if he were not joking, despite his ardor for the cause, Christensen would have been wrong.

Watch (2-minute video):

Ander Christensen tells the Lincoln, Nebraska city council that boneless chicken wings must be renamed.


Image credit: The Far Side, by Gary Larson, c. 1980.

Review: Beowulf: A New Translation, by Maria Dahvana Headley

Cover of Headley’s Beowulf: A New Translation

Cover of Headley’s Beowulf: A New Translation

29 August 2020

Headley, Maria Dahvana. Beowulf: A New Translation. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2020.

Joy.

That is the primary emotion I felt as I was reading Maria Dahvana Headley’s new translation of Beowulf. That’s not an emotion I normally associate with Beowulf, a 1,000+year-old, brooding, elegiac poem, written in a language that can barely be recognized as English, about men and monsters that is obsessed with how one should be remembered after one’s death. Don’t get me wrong. I love Beowulf. It is perhaps my favorite work of literature, but it is not a poem that tends to bring a smile to one’s face. Yet, Headley’s translation did that all the while I was reading it.

The most obvious feature about Headley’s translation is her use of present-day slang and idiom. She translates the first word of the poem, the famous Hwæt!, as Bro! The monster Grendel is fucked by fate. And Beowulf himself is Hygelac’s hit man, who at one point gives zero shits. In the hands of less-skilled writer this approach would be laughably silly, but Headley’s translation manages to simultaneously position the poem in a time long past while making it relevant to the current now. For instance, in the passage about the bad king Heremod, lines 1718–20, Headley writes:

                                    Somehow, though, his heart
was not a hawk but a drone. He bombed his own bases,
denied his Danes damages, kept entrenched in combat.

Is it anachronistic? Of course it is, but compare it to R.D. Fulk’s more “faithful” translation (which is also excellent, but in a very different way) of the same lines:

His breasthoard nonetheless grew bloodthirsty in spirit, by no means gave rings to the Danes for their glory.

By comparing Heremod’s failures of leadership to those of recent U.S. presidents, Headley makes the poem instantly accessible to the present-day reader, more than any ring-giving or breasthoards can do.

But this is not say the Headley’s translation isn’t faithful to the original. She translates line by line, never diverging from the story or pace of the original. Using the line numbers as reference, one can move almost effortlessly from her translation to the original. I found myself reading it with a copy of the Old English at hand, at first to check how accurate a translation it was, but soon because her translation kept bringing out details and nuances in the original that I had never noticed before. Her translation has made me appreciate the original all the more.

Her prosody is also evocative. It is virtually impossible to write good present-day English in the alliterative meter of the Old English original. Not only are the stresses and cadences of today’s language different, but we no longer have the reservoir of synonyms that make it possible to successfully alliterate over a 3,182-line poem. But Headley, using irregular meter, captures the rhythm and flow of the text. For instance, here is a passage I translated into prose the other day, before reading her book. Hrothgar is speaking to Beowulf at the feast after the warrior has killed Grendel’s mother, lines 1761–68:

                      Nu is þines mægnes blæd
ane hwile;     eft sona bið
þæt þec adl oððe ecg    eafoþes getwæfeð,
oððe fyres feng,     oððe flodes wylm,
oððe gripe meces,     oððe gares fliht,
oððe atol yldo;                 oððe eagena bearhtm
forsiteð ond forsworceð;     semninga bið
þæt ðec, dryht-guma,     deað oferswyðeð.

(Now, for a time, is the glory of your might: soon disease or blade will separate you from your strength, or the fire’s embrace, or the flood’s welling, or the sword’s grasp, or the spear’s flight, or the horrors of age; or the brightness of your eyes will fail and dim; at last it will be death that overcomes you, warrior.)

Now Headley’s translation of the same lines:

It’s only a season
that a young soldier’s strength stays stalwart—
before plague or blade bring obsolescence. A crackling
blaze, a rush of waves, a slippery sword-grip,
a spear soaring silently through the air,
or even the ague of age. Your gaze will darken, too, boy.
Your world will dim. Death will kneel over you eventually.
and solicit your surrender.

As with any translation, Headley is forced to make choices. Translation is a form of interpretation, especially from Old English where we often know the denotation of the words but not their connotations. It is clear that she had a vision of what she wanted to accomplish, and her choices are consistent, creating a coherent whole. And in some places, her interventions are inspired. For instance, in the manuscript at line 62 the scribe has omited the name of Hrothgar’s sister, and to mark this lacuna, Headley writes the parenthetical (her name’s a blur). Toward the end of the poem, as Wiglaf is facing the dragon, lines 2673–74 read:

Byrne ne meahte / geongum garwigan

(The mail-shirt was of no use to the young warrior)

Which Headley translates as:

His mail-shirt was like linen to her

turning a declarative statement into a simile that makes the encounter seem more tangible and desperate.

And throughout the episode with the dragon Headley uses female pronouns for the dragon instead of the male ones in the Old English, creating implications for the text that I’m still processing.

Another significant change is in how Headley casts the narrator. The Old English text has a Christian narrator telling a story of a pagan past and making moral and theological judgments in the process. For a reader today, this creates a further separation that did not exist for those early medieval folks reading or listening to the poem; the narrator is contemporaneous with them. But today, that framing distances the reader from both the narrator as well as from the story. Headley downplays or omits the theological commentary, while leaving the biblical references in place. This, coupled with the fact that both narrator and characters are speaking in the present-day vernacular, lessens the chronological distances and brings the story into today. Reading it, one gets the sense that narrator is telling us of events that happened only a short while ago.

In other places, Headley emphasizes details that are easy to miss or makes the implicit explicit, and sometimes she supplies a useful corrective to past translations. This is most easily seen in the passages with female characters, and nowhere clearer than with Grendel’s Mother. For example, line 1259 of the poem describes her as an ides aglæca. The word ides means woman and is almost always applied to queens and biblical matriarchs. And aglæca means opponent or warrior, applied to Beowulf himself, Grendel, and the dragon. Yet past male translators have rendered the line as ogress (Tolkien), monstrous hell-bride (Heaney), monster-woman (Liuzza), and lady, female-troublemaker (Fulk). Headley gives us the literal, straightforward translation of warrior-woman, providing a very different perspective on both her and on Beowulf, the man who kills her. Headley is not the first woman to translate Beowulf, but most of the translators have been men, and as with Emily Wilson’s translation of the Odyssey, it’s useful to be shaken out of the masculine perspective, especially with a poem like Beowulf, which drips testosterone.

I cannot recommend this translation more highly. It is accessible to the reader who has never encountered Beowulf before, yet it intrigues and challenges those who study the poem professionally. Nothing in it lessens the beauty or power of the original Old English, which is still there, along with the other more “faithful” translations, for those who want to tackle it. I can only hope that this translation not only attracts a new cohort of readers to one of the gems of English literature, but allows those already familiar with the poem to see new ways that it connects to the twenty-first century.

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